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Indonesia's Foreign Policy and Multi-Track Regionalism

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Abstract - This paper aimed to elaborate the orientation of Indonesian foreign policy in the Jokowi era by focusing on two main determinants. The first is regional determinants that lead to the emergence of multi-track regionalism in line with the launch of the ASEAN Community. Although the ASEAN countries still maintain the state-led regionalism principle, but various changes that took place in this region has risen various issues that push the emergence of new actors such as seen in the emergence of trans-national advocacy networks. The second determinant is on foreign policy orientation of Jokowi who wants to make connection the domestic modalities and the articulation of Indonesia in various international fora. By propose multitrack regionalism concept, this paper concludes that Indonesia could play a more significant role for new regional issues. Indonesia is also demanded to invite new social movement actors in reshaping foreign policy.

Key words: Indonesia foreign policy, Joko Widodo, ASEAN Community, multitrack regionalism

I. INTRODUCTION

From the beginning, President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) has made a clear line about the direction of foreign policy than his predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). SBY more looking at the international political fora as “a foreign policy outlet” for elevate the image of Indonesia as new democratic and moderate country. By using the jargon “thousand friends zero enemy”, Indonesia under Yudhoyono believe that international positioning will encourage domestic capacity. Whereas Jokowi try to change the pattern of foreign policy and more believe that the welfare of society or domestic capacity will determine the positioning of Indonesia in the

world affairs. From this principle, Jokowi then formulate four key concepts of foreign policy: *nawacita*, world maritime fulcrum, *trisakti* and domestic sovereignty.

Traditionally, foreign policy analysis has focused primarily on the quest to maintain and enhance a country's power and security (1). But today, both the international circumstance and domestic landscape has radically changed. The foreign policy agenda does not stop with security and economic issue. In recent decade, the new landscape is not only come from the emerge of diversity on scope and issue in international relations, but also in variety in the actors who engage in foreign policy making process (2).

II. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Single Track Regionalism of ASEAN

In terms of demographics, the Southeast Asian region is currently supporting more than 600 million people. That number could be a bonus can also be a demographic tragedy. Could be a bonus when the ASEAN Community design create centers equitable economic growth in all countries. Instead it would be a tragedy if the demographic development gaps still felt on the one hand, as well as policies to anticipate the mobility of people still *ad hoc* and handle through ritualistic pattern. It is important to emphasize two things, because the issue of protection and human security can no longer be handled by the state-centric approaches and model. The latest efforts to resolve this problem, namely the confluence of three Minister of Defense of Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia in Nusa Dua, Bali seems not enough to give a picture of bright particulars commitment of ASEAN to give protection for the people in this region.

When economic mobility and services controlled by regional agreement, why the same thing does not take

place in humans? In the future, given the sea trade lanes to be very dynamic and potential, urging it feels for ASEAN to define the meaning and limits of this protection. The next aspect is also urged to be reconstructed is a principle as "holy" in the region, namely "do not interfere in the domestic affairs" (non-interference principle). This principle has long become a regional morality are held in various patterns of conflict resolution in ASEAN. There needs to be revise for requalify which are categorized as "interfering in domestic affairs" and "safeguard regional security and stability". The principle of non-intervention birth in a context where the boundaries of state sovereignty has not been ravaged by the expansion of the market or a corporation and also the movement of humans as we are witnessing today. Undoubtedly, ASEAN countries should start to revise it. The principle of non-intervention could still be used for example when there are citizens of one of the ASEAN countries committed an unlawful act or criminal activities in other countries.

In the context of hostage conducted Abu Sayyaf group to the citizen, for example, collision classic in international politics where efforts to save human intervention (humanitarian intervention) must be diametrically opposite to the principle of non-intervention are firmly held by the Philippine government. This also applies in cases of other ASEAN countries. In fact, the cases which are the basis of all that is cases of trans-border and international spaces born of the post-state. Although ASEAN has designed the ARC (ASEAN Security Community) as a product of the Bali Concord II (2003), but the construction of the security threat is still seen as a traditional security threat to the state, not the security in the context of providing protection and rescue for humans.

Within four months, from May to August 2016, Indonesian sailors have repeatedly been targeted as a hostage by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). While there are still seven of those sailors held hostage now, the former were released by the effort of Indonesian government. The trend is, however, using hostage as the instrument of increasing economic resources of their organization and movement.

With regard to the ransom payment, there are two major arguments accounted. First, those who believe that

both the company where the sailors work and the government have to pay the ransom despite the huge of money demanded by ASG. Supporters to this idea believe that saving the lives is far more valuable and urgent than the amount of ransom.

While the second argument considers the ransom as a trap which potentially bring Indonesian government and company into "rythm of captors". For opponents of the ransom, even if the government is too soft and pay the financial demands were not cheap, this would be a bad precedent in the future. The other militant groups will replicate the pattern of ASG in capitalizing the hostage. Moreover, Indonesians would be, again, easily targeted by those militant groups since the government performs royal, yet weak indeed. Both decisions seem to be perplexing since it will either make the citizen to become the "ATM machine" for the radical movements or promote the idea that the government is anti-human.

State-led regionalism Problem

There is no doubt that Sulu Sea in the southern Philippines has been the hotspot for the criminals at sea given its significance for the seaborne trade worldwide, particularly between Indonesia and the Philippines. To this end, the questions of sovereignty and humanitarian actions emerge. Philippines government has so far been relying on its own capacity to overcome ASG and rejecting foreign military assistance due to its prestige and sovereignty. In international relations perspective, the position of Philippines government reflect a Hobbesian model. This perspective always belief that fostering state sovereignty is "sacred" goals.

Traffic in the Sulu Sea and Southeast Asia in general will be more dynamic as a result of the implementation of the ASEAN Community. This area will also be a very fragile region because it will be an easy target for pirates. Thus, it is critical to re-consider the state-centric security principle since it has proven slow in handling the citizen protection such as in the case of hostages by ASG.*By considering the case of hostage recurring and see the position in this strategic Sulu Sea there should be a paradigm shift in looking at this issue. Given the latest international political landscape characterized by the emergence of state interdependence,

the Philippines government's stance which tends to be anachronistic should be revised. The Philippine government is also too fixated on non-intervention principle that always maintained by ASEAN countries. The ASEAN architecture has experienced a transformation from old regionalism to new regionalism, which includes new challenges from non-traditional arena.

It is therefore critical to shift the paradigm that overcoming the threat posed by ASG is not only the responsibility of the Philippines government, but also Indonesia and Malaysia whose military assistances are also important. The ASEAN principle of non-interference has also exacerbated the situation.

At the regional level, it is time for ASEAN to reconstruct their regional security cooperation and redefine the meaning of "regional security". Security issues in ASEAN have been particularly focused on the traditional aspect such as open war, ideological contestation, balance of power, and others.

As such, the Minister of Defense's meeting of three countries; namely Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines several weeks ago in Bali reflects these traditional issues. The proposal portrays that human security issues are somehow less considered rather than the state security.

Design of the new regionalism will be betting Southeast Asian communities that will experience significant population growth ahead in the next decade. Based on the prediction that was released at the ASEAN Summit in Brunei Darussalam in 2013, the population of 10 ASEAN member countries is expected to reach 741.2 million in 2035, an increase compared to 2015 is estimated at 633.1 million. The average population growth per year ASEAN reached 0.85 percent and the Philippines become the country with the highest population growth (1.44%), followed by Malaysia (1.45%), Brunei Darussalam (1.40%), Laos (1.06%), Cambodia (1%), Singapore (0.93%), Indonesia (0.74%), Vietnam (0.65%) and Thailand increased 0.29% (*ASEAN Secretariat, 2015*).

The Roadmap shows assertiveness ASEAN in the new era, both in response political issues like democratization and human rights, as well as in responding

to issues of non-traditional as a matter of respect for the pluralism of cultures of each country to the problem of corruption (roadmap, *ibid*: 7-8). But on the other hand, the Roadmap shows that perceptual building very indicated the strength of regionalism patterns elitist or often called regionalism from above.

One characteristic of ASEAN is the strong models of conflict resolution typical of Asia that puts harmony, cooperation and non-intervention. The patterns of settlement as it had been trapped ASEAN into ritualism often fail to capture perubahan drastic that took place at the level of social and cultural. Third Wave of Southeast Asian Regionalism: Actor Fragmentation Region. Issues of non-traditional previously not of concern and not be seen, lately began to emerge and will certainly strengthen in the Southeast Asian region. Such issues for example on the frontier (border), the environment (particularly forests), migrant workers and human trafficking are some examples that must be accommodated in the design of the new regionalism Southeast Asia. There is also less important is the issue of human trafficking in which Southeast Asia is one of the zones that are considered the most dangerous in the world. Securitization of the problems of non-traditional ask not only perceptual change from the traditional actors, but also need accommodation another perception of new actors who also has play in the transnational space of Southeast Asia today.

Under Jokowi administration, Indonesia should calculate its capacity as a middle power in international politics. Some publications have mentioned that capacity and position Indonesia in Southeast Asia increasingly lagging behind, particularly in terms of competitiveness. Indonesia's competitiveness run to decline and put in 41 position in the World Economic Forum (WEF) report in 2016. Education sector in Indonesia scored very low in the report (WEF, 2016). Problem immediate attention is the position of Indonesia in fact extremely weak even compared with another ASEAN countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore.

Seen at the macro level, the phase of ASEAN as an association of cooperation between countries can be divided into three important periods. The first period may be referred to as regionalism making process (1960-1980's).



This period is a period of consolidation merupakan Southeast Asian countries to agree on building cooperation that they want to form. This period refers to the effort to build a blueprint of regional cooperation. The second period is a phase-state developmental regionalism in the next two decades (1980s to early 2000s). This period coincided with the workings of - to borrow Jayasurya (2001: 33) - "embedded mercantilism Southeast Asia". This phase is characterized by the operation of the production pattern typical of Asian capitalism in which the state becomes the sole entity in moving the region's economic growth. Consequently, regional initiatives are always oriented to the logic of growth, also at the same time qualify actors should be involved in regional dynamics. Perhaps the product of this phase is the growing strength of the principle of non-intervention, the more elitist formation of ASEAN and Southeast Asia in the more open the doors of trade and investment from outside.

Toward Multi-Track Regionalism

For a long time, the state became an important actor and executor of regionalism in the various schemes launched by the leaders of Southeast Asia. The most significant changes occurred before the decade of the 90s when the flow of human migration and transnational community movement began to give another perspective on the direction of regionalism. Hegemonic power in the first phase, namely the United States, which provide for the formation of political intrusion on roadmapping of ASEAN in the early, recently start to face new competitors. Whereas hegemonic power in the second phase, "the goose" Japan, also began shrinking economic roles in connection with the emergence of new economic powers of Asia such as South Korea, India, China and Taiwan.

The emerge of "muti-track regionalism" is an implication rather than referring to a planned design by the ASEAN members. There are two important phenomena worthy identified why this phase is very important phase for ASEAN. First, the reduced regimentation traditional actors in international politics in Southeast Asia. Second, at the same time, there is also a reduced role of the state as a direct implication of the democratic transition process in a number of Southeast Asian countries. The first phenomenon led to the increasing number of spaces of

interaction and cooperation between the ASEAN countries with new actors in international relations. The second phenomenon characterized by increasingly strong influence of actors on the regional arena of civil society involved in construction issues and establish new pattern of regional network. Perhaps much of radar surveillance state in Southeast Asia appears what the Keck and Sikkink (1999) called transnational advocacy networks or by Khaldor (2007) called as a global civil society.

The strength of civil society such as non-state organizations (NGOs) in ASEAN is now impossible to ignore the leading role. Various new issues in the regional scope began to emerge as a direct impact of globalization and the presence of non-state actors. Such as the strength of civil society activists has designed some initiatives linking the various elements and issues that cross national borders.

On the issue of human rights, for example, civil society networks that work in Southeast Asia are very active to propose ASEAN Human Rights Body. The agency is trying to adopt a similar institution that is well established in Europe. However, the proposal still meet with perceptual differences and visions enforcement of human rights among the ASEAN countries themselves. These two issues - the environment and human rights, gave an picture of the actual state sovereignty which aspects are still enforced and on which aspects began having pulverization. Perhaps because human rights issues are still directly related to state sovereignty in the region, most of ASEAN countries using the human rights principle of "respect for sovereignty" to avoid conflict. While environmental issues, the idea does not seem strong enough to use. Even in environmental issues, the mainstreaming process actually carried out by civil society and the state to follow all of the designed from civil society (Wirasenjaya and Herningtyas, 2013)

Alexander C. Chandra (2009) argued about the need to change the way ASEAN regionalism from elitist to populist regionalism. Actually, among ASEAN leaders themselves began to grow awareness to involve as many actors in developing the ASEAN Community. However, according to Chandra, the leaders in this region prefer to use the term "people-oriented" rather than "people-centered". Both are obviously implies different things. In



Chanda's point of view: "... the people-oriented ASEAN can be interpreted that the policies pursued by the Association's policy-makers shall be oriented toward the concerns and interests of the people. However, under this principle, the final decision making still lies amongst the region's political elite. In contrast, ASEAN as a people-centered organization call for the grouping to place people at the heart, or center, of its decision-making process ... "(*ibid*)

Civil society groups are born through the process of expanding the democratic norm in most ASEAN countries, and as direct consequences of the change of nature of international relations in general. As alluded to earlier, various initiatives were born in responding to issues of non-traditional has spawned new patterns of cooperation, the alliance also civil society collaboration both within the Southeast Asian region itself and built by the civil society network that crossed the borders of the region. In the new spaces of regionalism which now bring new actors region, perhaps Indonesia could play a more active and articulate. Transnational character actor among others they will build cooperation based on issues rather than historical ties. Each of these issues is now popular in international relations such as the rights of economic, social and cultural (Ecosoc rights) and climate change will be strengthened. And all the issues that put Indonesia as the room is very important mobilization. On the issue of democracy, for example, Indonesia - with all the limitations and shortcomings remaining - still considered to show democracy more advanced than other countries in Southeast Asia. New York Times (09/04/2014) in a special report even does not hesitate to call Indonesia as a role model of democracy in Southeast Asia. At the Yudhoyono era, the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) is a very strategic initiative to make democracy as a foreign policy determinant. BDF is one sample of smart power to explain to the world about "Asia experience " and became a potential window to build democracy with Asia culture.

III. CONCLUSION

Traditionally, foreign policy has focus primarily on the quest to maintain and enhance a country's power and security.

By and large, it is time to Jokowi to invite new actors in fostering his foreign policy regarding new challenges in regional level. Indonesia has potential regional issues such as the environment, refugees, human trafficking, and also the issue of disaster management. All that gives challenges and agenda for Indonesian foreign policy in an effort to build multi-track regionalism toward new architecture of ASEAN cooperation in the future. President Joko Widodo still hostage by some domestic political groups. Perhaps, this situation is potential to create a political trap and give constrain to capitalize soft power and smart power into foreign policy formulation.

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